

A teal circular logo with the text "bit-x-bit" in white lowercase letters.

bit-x-bit

A photograph of a stage with a screen and curtains. A teal banner is overlaid at the bottom. The text "PHOTOGRAPH BY BRIAN COHEN" is in the top right corner.

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bit-x-bit

ISSA – December 4, 2015

# “Computer Forensics: An Intro to Trade Secret Theft Forensics”

Presented by

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## Example Cases

- Theft of Trade Secrets
- Workplace harassment
- Non-Compete
- Unauthorized Access (hacking)
- “Doctored” Documents

## Speaking of Trade Secret Cases...

- Sales engineer of manufacturing company leaves for a direct competitor and takes design and pricing info
- Executive leaves energy company and starts a competing business, using his old employers data

## Key Considerations

- ESI is Fragile
  - Easy to change
  - Easy to delete
- Once overwritten, it is gone forever
- Never work from the original evidence\*\*
- Make a verified copy



## Data Collection – Where To Go?

- **Computers:**
  - dead box forensic image or incident response / live
  - active email and documents (still preserve the metadata!)
- **Network or End-Point Security Logs**
  - SIEM < Malware, firewall, IDS/IPS, DLP, etc
- **Mobile Phone:**
  - Usually covers active and some deleted content
- **Targeted “active” locations:**
  - Email server mailbox
  - file server “shared” folder
- **Social Media:**
  - more than just screenshots

## Questions to Ask

- Who are the key players and what IT systems do they use?
- Are any automated deletion processes operating on the IT Systems?
- What issues in the case will the electronic evidence need to address?
- What collection method will preserve the electronic evidence and associated metadata that will be needed to address the issues in the case?

### Offsite Tape Storage

ABC Records (3<sup>rd</sup> Party)  
Picks up and delivers backup tapes every 5 days  
Retains approximately 100 LTO-3 backup tapes

### Backup System

Backup software : Backup Exec Pro  
LTO Tape Library (holds 30 Tapes)

Tape Rotation  
Daily Incremental – 5 day tape rotation  
Weekly Full– 30 day tape rotation  
Monthly Full – 1 Year tape rotation

When tapes are returned from the 3<sup>rd</sup> party vendor they are loaded into the tape changer and are subject to overwriting

### Work Laptop

- Only Custodian A has a Work laptop
- Used for presentations on the road and checking email

### Cell Phones

- Custodian A and Custodian B have company issued smart phones (Apple iPhones)
- The phones are used to check company email and send business and personal text messages

### Accounting Database

- Microsoft SQL server based system
- Records are retained indefinitely. No purging.
- Payroll records for the custodians are kept within this system back to 2002

### Email server

Email Software: Microsoft Exchange  
Contains 50 Mailboxes  
Mail boxes are limited to 2 GBs in size  
Configured to retain email on the server

**Deletion Policy:**

- Messages not moved from inbox within 30 days are automatically deleted.
- Deleted messages are purged from the server “dumpster” within 7 days

### Network Drives/Shares

- Every user has their own private network drive accessible only to them.
- Each department has a common shared drive that is only accessible by the employees that work within the department
- There is no automatic deletion from the network shares. Files are retained indefinitely.


### Work Desktops

- Not backed up and no auto deletion
- Users are encouraged but not required to store documents within their network drive, which is backed up.
- Users should not have local PST files
- Average hard drive size is 500 GB
- Typical MS Office applications are installed, including Outlook



# Write Blocking

- Prevents inadvertent changes
- Hardware (Tableau, Wiebetech)
- Software (f-response, safe block)
- Built in media mechanisms (SD Cards, Floppies!)





# Authentication

- Chain of Custody / Record Keeping
  - photos, serial numbers, from who to who, etc
- Digital signatures (hash)
  - MD5, SHA-1

## (some) Artifacts - Windows

- Registry Hives
- Prefetch
- LNK files / Jumplists
- Internet Browser files
- Recycle Bin
- Filesystem
- OS Log files
- Application specific logs
- Unallocated

- [-] DISPLAY
- [-] FDC
- [-] HDAUDIO
- [-] HID
- [-] HTREE
- [-] IDE
- [-] ISAPNP
- [-] MODEMWARE
- [-] PCI
- [-] PCIDE
- [-] Root
- [-] STORAGE
- [-] SW
- [-] USB
- [-] USBSTOR
  - [-] CdRom&Ven\_LG&Prod\_VS910\_4G\_CDROM&Rev\_0000
  - [-] Disk&Ven\_&Prod\_USB\_DISK\_2.0&Rev\_1.13
  - [-] Disk&Ven\_JetFlash&Prod\_Transcend\_8GB&Rev\_8.07
  - [-] Disk&Ven\_Kingston&Prod\_DataTraveler\_II&Rev\_PMAP
    - [-] 5B750D8DEB6E&0
    - [-] 5B76138C164E&0
  - [-] Disk&Ven\_LG\_Elect&Prod\_ronics\_Inc.Mass&Rev\_stor
  - [-] Disk&Ven\_SAMSUNG&Prod\_HM160HI&Rev\_
  - [-] Disk&Ven\_Seagate&Prod\_Backup+\_BL&Rev\_0409
  - [-] Disk&Ven\_ST310005&Prod\_24AS&Rev\_

Name	Type	Data
DeviceDesc	REG_SZ	Disk drive
Capabilities	REG_DWORD	0x00000010 (16)
UINumber	REG_DWORD	0x00000000 (0)
HardwareID	REG_MULTI_SZ	USBSTOR\DiskKingstonDataTraveler_II_PMAP USBSTOR\Di
CompatibleL...	REG_MULTI_SZ	USBSTOR\Disk USBSTOR\RAW
ClassGUID	REG_SZ	{4D36E967-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}
Service	REG_SZ	disk
ConfigFlags	REG_DWORD	0x00000000 (0)
ParentIdPrefix	REG_SZ	7&6199d3b&0
Driver	REG_SZ	{4D36E967-E325-11CE-BFC1-08002BE10318}\0002
Class	REG_SZ	DiskDrive
Mfg	REG_SZ	(Standard disk drives)
FriendlyName	REG_SZ	Kingston DataTraveler II USB Device

**Key Properties**

Last Written Time	3/28/2012 21:34:04 UTC

00 44 00 69 00 73 00 6B 00-20 00 64 00 72 00 69 00	D i s k . d r i v e . . .
10 76 00 65 00 00 00	v e . . .

# Registry USB Deliverable

Device	Serial Number	First Recognized	Last Recognized
BUFFALO HD-PXU2 USB Device	0010100703057X370	10/12/2011 08:50:11 AM	10/31/2013 11:34:33 AM
USB Flash Disk USB Device	CCBB02010101490867531	12/17/2011 10:39:21 AM	10/15/2013 09:46:42 AM
USB 2.0 USB Flash Drive USB Device	AA0000000358791	05/06/2013 03:25:28 PM	05/07/2013 09:52:16 AM
Kindle Internal Storage USB Device	B00E150115230ST	12/20/2011 09:51:16 AM	05/01/2013 06:22:01 AM
Flash Drive AU_USB2.0 USB Device	SI7J9II7	01/23/2012 03:14:11 PM	01/29/2013 05:14:19 PM
SanDisk Cruzer Mini USB Device	2004101610cf0d3227c	12/14/2012 02:19:36 PM	12/21/2012 03:19:39 PM
USB Flash Disk USB Device	CCBC131101303319775009	08/08/2012 03:46:01 PM	08/15/2012 05:46:03 PM
USB 2.0 Flash disk USB Device	1000000DB7893	02/15/2011 10:22:49 AM	02/14/2012 09:22:52 PM
USB2.0 Flash Disk USB Device	f150f7c	10/13/2011 11:55:53 AM	10/21/2011 12:31:30 PM
SanDisk Cruzer Blade USB Device	2004431743031FB13BA	06/16/2011 02:19:45 PM	08/15/2011 07:59:21 AM
SanDisk Cruzer Blade USB Device	2004432280087FB83FC0	06/01/2011 10:44:46 AM	06/01/2011 10:44:48 AM
hp v125w USB Device	AA0C100209935636	05/12/2011 04:08:01 PM	05/19/2011 02:52:07 PM

# Registry – Need to Unscramble Things First!

AccessData Registry Viewer - [NTUSER.DAT.copy0]

File Edit Report View Window Help

MountPoints2  
NewShortcutHandlers  
RecentDocs  
RunMRU  
SearchPlatform  
Shell Folders  
StartPage  
StartPage2  
Streams  
StuckRects2  
Taskband  
User Shell Folders  
UserAssist  
{CEBFF5CD-ACE2-4F4F-9178-99...  
Count  
{F4E57C4B-2036-45F0-A9AB-44...  
VisualEffects  
Wallpapers  
Ext  
Group Policy  
HomeGroup  
ime  
Internet Settings  
MCT

Name	Type	Data
Zvpefbfsg.Jvaqbjf.TrvgvatFgnegrq	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
HRZR_PGYFRFFVBA	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
Zvpefbfsg.Jvaqbjf.ZrqvnPragre	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
{1NP14R77-02R7-4R5Q-0744-2R01NR519807}\pnyp.rkr	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
Zvpefbfsg.Jvaqbjf.FgvpxlAbgrf	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
{1NP14R77-02R7-4R5Q-0744-2R01NR519807}\FavccvatGbbby.rkr	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
{1NP14R77-02R7-4R5Q-0744-2R01NR519807}\zfcnvag.rkr	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
Zvpefbfsg.Jvaqbjf.ErzbrgrQrfxgbc	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
{1NP14R77-02R7-4R5Q-0744-2R01NR519807}\zntavsl.rkr	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
{6Q809377-6NS0-4440-8957-N3773S02200R}\Zvpefbfsg Tnzrf\Fbyvgnver\fbyvgnver.rkr	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
HRZR_PGYPHNPbhag:pgbe	REG_BINARY	FF FF F
{S38OS404-1Q43-42S2-9305-67QR0O28SP23}\rkybere.rkr	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
Zvpefbfsg.VagreargRkcybere.Qrsnhyg	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
Zvpefbfsg.Jvaqbjf.PbagebyCnary	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
{1NP14R77-02R7-4R5Q-0744-2R01NR519807}\pzq.rkr	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
{1NP14R77-02R7-4R5Q-0744-2R01NR519807}\fyhv.rkr	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
Q:\frghc64.rkr	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
{1NP14R77-02R7-4R5Q-0744-2R01NR519807}\FlfgrzCebcregvrErzbrgr.rkr	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
Zvpefbfsg.Jvaqbjf.PbagebyCnary.Gnfxone	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
Zvpefbfsg.NhgbTrarengqrq.{8NOQ94SO-R7Q6-84N6-N997-P918RQQR0NR5}	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
{1NP14R77-02R7-4R5Q-0744-2R01NR519807}\jhnc.rkr	REG_BINARY	00 00 0
{C38OS404-1Q43-42S2-9305-67QR0O28SP23}\EbrgrgrQrfxgbc\Fbyvgnver\Fbyvgnver.rkr	REG_BINARY	00 00 0

Key Properties

Last Written Time 04/04/2012 5:32:27 UTC

Value Properties

Value Name ROT13 {1AC14E77-02E7-4E5D-B;}

Time 04/01/2011 4:27:57 UTC

```

00 00 00 00 00 09 00 00 00-0B 00 00 00 60 5B 03 00 ..... [ ..
10 00 00 80 BF 00 00 80 BF-00 00 80 BF 00 00 80 BF .....
20 00 00 80 BF 00 00 80 BF-00 00 80 BF 00 00 80 BF .....
30 00 00 80 BF 00 00 80 BF-FF FF FF FF 5E 7C 7F 2D .....
40 25 F0 CB 01 00 00 00 00-
    
```

# Registry – User Assist

Tue Jan 7 13:56:56 2014 Z

{6D809377-6AF0-444B-8957-A3773F02200E}\CCleaner\CCleaner64.exe (17)

Thu Jan 2 20:08:44 2014 Z

{6D809377-6AF0-444B-8957-A3773F02200E}\SUPERAntiSpyware\SUPERAntiSpyware.exe (2)

Thu Jan 2 12:48:16 2014 Z

{7C5A40EF-A0FB-4BFC-874A-C0F2E0B9FA8E}\Petro Vend\Phoenix\P4W.exe (1)

Tue Dec 31 16:13:28 2013 Z

{7C5A40EF-A0FB-4BFC-874A-C0F2E0B9FA8E}\Malwarebytes' Anti-Malware\mbam.exe (1)

Mon Dec 30 16:12:36 2013 Z

C:\Users\jdoe\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Temporary Internet Files\Content.IE5\YTC2D3NN\ccsetup409.exe (1)

# Prefetch

- **Naming convention...**  
cmd.exe-06264562.pf
- **What does a prefetch file tell us?**
  - **Name** of the executable (or software application)
  - List of **DLL files** used by that software
  - **Count** of how many times the software program has been run
  - **Timestamp** identifying the last time the program was run
- Antiforensic tools
  - Wiping tools
  - Time modification tools
- Software installed on a system
  - Uncommon cloud applications
- Malicious activity
  - File paths with users not authorized to use the system

## Recycle Bin (Win 7+)

- \$I files contain the info regarding what was deleted (original name, path, deletion date/time, size)
- \$R files are the actual deleted files

\$I13DF3L.zip

\$IUUH4BS.library-ms

\$R3TPCIK.library-ms

\$R3TPCIK.library-ms.Fil...

\$R6MHA5W

\$R8XLAY7

**\$RI3DF3L.zip**

\$RUUH4BS.library-ms

\$RUUH4BS.library-ms.Fi...



# LNK Files

## Link target information

Local Path	G:\Quotes\CustomerX\CustomerX.pdf
Volume Type	Removable Disk
Volume Serial Number	DA74-E37F
File size	307749
Creation time (UTC)	9/6/2007 5:09:40 PM
Last write time (UTC)	7/18/2007 2:23:14 PM
Last access time (UTC)	3/23/2008 4:00:00 AM

# LNK Files

Full Path	Created Date	Modified Date	Accessed Date
\Part_2\NONAME-NTFS\Documents and Settings\JSmith\Recent\CustomerX.lnk	3/23/2008 11:09	3/23/2008 11:09	3/23/2008 11:09

# Unallocated

```

<div>Sounds good, talk then.</div><div><br></div><div>Sam<div><div class="adm"><div
id="q_13a7410b18dff736_1" class="ajR h4"><div class="ajT"></div></div></div><div
class="h5"><br><br><div class="gmail_quote">On Thu, Nov 22, 2013, at 8:03 AM, Jim Smith <span
dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:jimsmithfakeemail@gmail.com"
target="_blank">jimsmithfakeemail@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>
wrote:<br>blockquote class="gmail_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left: 1px #ccc solid;padding-
left: 1ex"><div dir="auto"><div>Sam, lets talk at 10:30am heading into a meeting.
</div><div><br></div><div>Chat soon <div> <br><br><div>Regards,</div><div>Jim</div><div>
</div><div>Jim Smith</div><div>Vice President of HR</div><div>Your Biggest Competitor Inc
</div></div><div><a href="tel:555-867-5309" value="+15558675309" target=" blank">555-867-
5309</a> mobile</div> </div><div><div><div><br>On Nov 22, 2013, at 7:27 AM, Sam Smith &lt;<a
href="mailto:samsmithfakeemail@gmail.com" target="_blank">samsmithfakeemail@gmail.com</a>&gt;
wrote:<br><br></div><blockquote type="cite"><div>Jim,<div><br></div><div>Sorry I couldnt call
last night.</div><div><br></div><div>Does 8 AM work on your
end?</div><div><br></div><div>Thanks,</div><div><br></div><div>Sam<br>

```

# Unallocated

<div>**Sounds good, talk then.**</div><div><br></div><div>**Sam**<div><div class="adm"><div
 id="q\_13a7410b18dff736\_1" class="ajR h4"><div class="ajT"></div></div></div><div
 class="h5"><br><br><div class="gmail\_quote">**On Thu, Nov 22, 2013 at 8:03 AM, Jim Smith** <span
 dir="ltr">&lt;<a href="mailto:jimsmithfakeemail@gmail.com"
 target="\_blank">jimsmithfakeemail@gmail.com</a>&gt;</span>
 <br>blockquote class="gmail\_quote" style="margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left: 1px #ccc solid;padding-
 left: 1ex"><div dir="auto"><div>**Sam, lets talk at 10:30am heading into a meeting.**
</div><div><br></div><div>**Chat soon** <div> <br><br><div>**Regards,**</div><div>**Jim**</div><div>
</div><div>**Jim Smith**</div><div>**Vice President of HR**</div><div>**Your Biggest Competitor Inc**
</div></div><div><a href="tel:555-867-5309" value="+15558675309" target=" blank">**555-867-
5309**</a> **mobile**</div> </div><div><div><div><br>**On Nov 22, 2013, at 7:27 AM, Sam Smith** &lt;<a
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end?**</div><div><br></div><div>**Thanks,**</div><div><br></div><div>**Sam**<br>

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Sam



# Why Memory?

- Correlate or expand on findings from disk and log analysis
- Find things not present on disk (malware)
- Everything from the OS goes through RAM
- Network connections, IP addresses, URLs
- Encryption keys/passwords

# Memory – How To Get It

- Capture it live (memory dump)
  - Moonsols (DumpIt)
  - Volatility
  - Memoryze
  - Redline
- Hibernation File (hiberfil.sys from your disk analysis)
- Virtual Machines
  - .vmem (Vmware)
  - .mem (Parallels)
  - .bin (MS Hyper-V)

# Questions

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